The Judges would be creating a new law that effectively bans anyone in the UK using Twitter. Anyone found using it, having a Tweet app on their phone or mentioning its name would be in contempt of court and would go to jail.
All those whose crimes are petty like rape and murder would be set free under the Human Rights Act because it "wasn't their fault" to make way for over zealous gossipers who have nothing better to do than spread lies, filth and distress to celebrities who try and keep the little people entertained.
Here is the latest injunction
England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >>
UKG v The Population of the UK (including Scotland) EWHC 1341 (QB) (31 May 2011)
 EWHC 6666(QB)
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
|- and -|
|THE LITTLE PEOPLE||Defendant|
??? QC (instructed by Matrix) for the Applicant
JOE BLOGGS QC (instructed by No Win No Fee LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 31 May 2011
Crown Copyright ©
- Mr Justice Judge:
- Notwithstanding the title to the action, this judgment relates to the Judges, that is us the super privileged and powerful, and the little people of the United Kingdom, including Scotland despite over ruling the Scottish legal system, who are causing us problems.
- The Applicant is a body of Judges who earn huge fees from the over use of injunctions by Celebrities. The Applicant wishes to apply a blanket ban on technology because it is undermining the efficient processes of the Court.
- In Attorney-General v Punch  1 AC 1046 Lord Nicholls said:
- It is clear then that the little people are in contempt of court. The use of Twitter, SMS, Facebook and blogs are no longer allowed to be used by any UK citizen and anyone who does will not only be in contempt of court but shall endure a minimum of 10 years in prison with no probation.
- This judgment must not be disclosed to anyone who is not a QC.
"2. Contempt of court is the established, if unfortunate, name given to the species of wrongful conduct which consists of interference with the administration of justice. It is an essential adjunct of the rule of law. Interference with the administration of justice can take many forms. In civil proceedings one obvious form is a wilful failure by a party to the proceedings to comply with a court order made against him. By such a breach a party may frustrate, to greater or lesser extent, the purpose the court sought to achieve in making the order against him…
3. The form of contempt asserted by the Attorney General in the present case is different, although closely related. Sometimes the purpose a court seeks to achieve in making an order against a party to proceedings may be deliberately impeded or prejudiced by the conduct of a third party. This may take more than one form. The third party may be assisting, that is, aiding and abetting, a breach of the order by the person against whom the order was made. Then he is an accessory to the breach of the order….
4. Aiding and abetting a breach of the order by the person specifically restrained by the order is not always an essential ingredient of 'third party' contempt. The purpose of a court in making an order may be deliberately frustrated by a third party even though he is acting independently of the party against whom the order was made. An interlocutory order for the non-disclosure of information is the paradigm example of the type of order where this principle is in point. The Spycatcher litigation is the best known recent instance of this. It is a contempt of court by a third party, with the intention of impeding or prejudicing the administration of justice by the court in an action between two other parties, himself to do the acts which the injunction restrains the defendant in that action from committing if the acts done have some significant and adverse affect on the administration of justice in that action: see Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd  1 AC 191, 203D, 206G-H, and, for the latter part, Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ in Attorney General v Newspaper Publishing plc  1 WLR 927, 936. Lord Phillips MR neatly identified the rationale of this form of contempt, at  QB 1028, 1055, paragraph 87:
"The contempt is committed not because the third party is in breach of the order - the order does not bind the third party. The contempt is committed because the purpose of the judge in making the order is intentionally frustrated with the consequence that the conduct of the trial is disrupted."
Copyright Policy |
Donate to BAILII